Post-war Reconstruction: Concerns, Models and Approaches

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POST–WAR RECONSTRUCTION: CONCERNS, MODELS & APPROACHES

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Acknowledgments

Few of the ideas and cases presented in this working paper are original; most are drawn from the work of scholars and researchers who dedicated the better part of their careers to the problem of post-war reconstruction. The recent work of Fred Cuny, E. Haas & R.W. Kates, and Kimberly Maynard proved especially useful.

This paper also reflects the practical knowledge and research findings of several members of Minerva Partners whose activities have occasionally focused on the problems of reconstruction; their input and ongoing collaboration is much appreciated. Notable among them are Kirstin Sechler and Randall Mason. The document was researched and written by Jon Calame.

It is hoped that the insights gathered here will do justice to the labor of those from whom so much has been borrowed, interpreted, and abstracted for the sake of a concise and abbreviated overview. All errors and omissions belong to the author.

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Introduction

Scope of Inquiry

Exploration of reconstruction issues here will be narrowed to urban, post-conflict scenarios. Extreme scenarios throw core issues into sharp relief. Violent inter-ethnic conflicts frequently result in destruction of the iconic built environment because it is a place where emblematic and psychologically potent associations can be exploited directly for purposes of widespread psychological demoralization within the ranks of an enemy population.

Armed conflict will be treated as a type of disaster resulting from social phenomena differing little in its physical impacts from disasters resulting from natural phenomena. The difference is felt in the aftermath, when the strength and effectiveness of coping mechanisms vary greatly.
Emphasis will be placed on the negative impacts of conflict in relation to social development and how external intervention can optimally weaken them.

Disclaimer

A working paper of such brevity cannot illuminate more than a handful of ideas chosen from among many that deserve careful consideration by practitioners with an interest in post-war reconstruction. In no way does this document represent a condensation of the most important and useful ideas in what is a large and growing scholarly domain. A handful of topics were chosen in light of the special interests of the Center for Macro Projects and Diplomacy (henceforth CMPD), the built environment professional, the student, and the community of conscientious private investors—all persons concerned about the repetition of mistakes observable in the wake of major humanitarian disasters and all capable of formulating constructive, innovative responses.

Reliable longitudinal studies of post-war recovery processes are few, and the number of war-torn sites not yet subjected to formal analysis is large. Scant academic literature is devoted to the post-war experience of communities in Asia, the Soviet Union, Greece, Spain after its Civil War, sub-Saharan Africa, or the Palestinian West Bank, to list only a few. Certainly the current inhabitants of Iraq, Afghanistan, the Sudan and Chechnya would benefit from such research when fighting ends in their cities and villages—if it existed and were accessible. Likewise, the residents of other cities blighted by war would gain insight from the timely analysis of their experiences.

Up to the present there exists a chronic lack of research to facilitate change and improvement in the post-conflict relief system; studies tend to be overly technical, segmented, and short term. Results are rarely placed in a standard framework that would allow for translation from one post-war scenario to another, as noted by Cuny and others.1

The cursory and somewhat arbitrary treatment of issues that follows is intended to foster debate and illuminate promising avenues for future research rather than constitute a reliable index of key concerns. It is a prompt, not a catalog. It is also aimed at practical rather than scholarly goals: constructive critique, recognition of avoidable mistakes, and speculation about viable, large-scale post-war reconstruction projects. The ideal outcome would be identification of such a project, suitable for near-term implementation, that could illuminate existing best practices along with innovative new approaches to an old problem.
Overview

The need for a deeper, more complete understanding of success factors for post-war
reconstruction is growing.

Small-scale, non-conventional wars—involving groups most easily identified by language,
religion, or place rather than nationality—have blossomed since the Cold War in a global
renaissance of civil conflict. These wars typically lack uniforms, leaders, rules, treaties,
conventions, exemptions, beginnings, and ends; their seeds are sown in the swampy terrain of
cultural identity and irredentism. Long obscured by macro-political rivalries, inter-ethnic conflict
has become ubiquitous. More specifically, since World War II there has been a clear shift in global
warfare trends from inter- to intra-state conflict: 59 of 64 wars occurring between 1945 and 1988
were intra-state or ‘civil’ wars, and during these conflicts about 80% of the war dead were killed
by someone of their own nationality.

This trend peaked around 1990 with the height of what Marshall terms the ‘Third World War’,
during which insecurity within states systematically led to violence between rival groups. During
this same period, 127 new sovereign states have been created, and 35 new international land
boundaries have been drawn since 1980. Currently, about 46 protracted civil conflicts are
ongoing, and of these approximately 87 per cent are grounded in contested group rights or
threatened collective identity. The last five years have witnessed significant inter-cultural
hostilities in Afghanistan, Angola, East Timor, Chechnya, Dagestan, Iraq, Kosovo, India, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Rwanda, and this kind of hostility is
on the rise worldwide.

Civilian urban populations have been severely affected by the surge of inter-ethnic warfare; in
relative terms, they have recently suffered more than during any other period. In World War I,
for example, about 43% of all battle-related deaths were civilian. That figure rose to around 59%
in the course of World War II, and since then—during a period when the number of wars within
states overtook the number between states—civilian deaths constituted approximately 74% of the
wartime totals. The scale and intensity of psychological trauma suffered by non-combatants has
risen proportionately, and urban residents are especially prone to overwhelming loss,
dislocation, and prolonged anxiety.

As the state of contemporary warfare rapidly devolves towards fratricidal conflicts, the
likelihood of purposeful violence in historic, heterogeneous cities increases proportionately.
Examples of this phenomenon abound: demolition and bloodshed surrounding the sacred temple complex of Ayodhya, in Gujurat; the calculated destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas; the felling of the Old Bridge in Mostar; the toppling of Hussein statues in Baghdad; the razing of the World Trade Center towers, etc. These global trends and statistics pose challenging questions about where future wrecks may take place, how they are to be avoided, and who should be on hand to assist when disasters occur.

Traditionally, the scene of a wreck is treated as an emergency and the most urgent symptoms are quickly addressed by a familiar international consortium of government agencies, aid organizations, humanitarian relief groups, environmental organizations and others. Plans for recovery and rebuilding are quickly drafted and implemented. Conventional wisdom asserts that stepping back to study the traditional social needs and expectations of a beleaguered community is a luxury that cannot be afforded while basic survival is not yet assured. Even when traditional or emblematic built environments are used as targets during these destructive episodes, the built environment profession rarely presents itself as a potential partner for these reconstruction programs. The field tends to remain aloof, waiting to offer expert assistance only after stable resolutions have been achieved and other more “basic” forms of assistance have been delivered. In most cases, this sluggishness costs architects, urban planners, and conservators opportunities to make creative and serious contributions. As a result, valuable expertise is subtracted from the social development processes.

Such habits and assumptions need to be overturned; built environment professionals need to fully realize their potential to contribute in direct and meaningful ways to collaborative social revitalization efforts where architecture is targeted or group identity is violently contested. One objective of this paper is to illuminate paths forward in this direction.

**Objectives & Approach**

This paper is intended to contribute information and suggestions to a larger discussion of reconstruction during an international conference to be hosted in 2005 by the CMPD. The object of that discussion is the identification and elaboration of a large-scale physical intervention designed to embody optimal ideas and strategies for reconstruction.

Rather than rely exclusively on broad stroke recommendations extrapolated from the professional literature, well-documented case studies will be compared in order to identify patterns and draw conclusions of a practical nature. These cases have been selected to reveal the
course of reconstruction under different social, political, and economic conditions; they also show the impacts of certain strategies over time. After collecting useful insights from previous research and gleaning patterns from the selected case studies, a list of key concerns will be presented along with a handful of recommendations for further inquiry and new project design.

**Assumptions & Definitions**

This working paper has adopted a comparative, case study approach because it assumes the transferability of good solutions and strategies from one post-disaster scenario to another. It takes for granted the reader’s interest in patterns of success and error in this domain as well as a practical interest in forging improved approaches to post-disaster rehabilitation from a professional perspective. Emphasis is placed on the physical environment with full awareness that structural and spatial concerns should never be divorced from their social functions and impacts.

Frederick Cuny has pointed out that disaster, whether natural or man-made, is a process “defined on the basis of its human consequences, not on the phenomenon that caused it.” That is, an earthquake or tidal wave does not constitute a disaster unless someone is there to experience powerful negative impacts. His writing makes clear that a disaster is not just an emergency or an isolated episode because it stems from developmental patterns preceding calamitous events by years, decades, or centuries. The same forces that created vulnerability in a traumatized society prior to disaster continue to affect that community during and after reconstruction. Abiding by this supposition immediately makes post-war reconstruction a topic intimately tied to class, public policy, and civil society writ large. Disaster should be measured by relief agencies in terms of social, psychological, physical, economic, and political disruption. Accordingly, disaster can be viewed as the product of longstanding development patterns that promote conditions associated with human trauma. Further, these traumas result from impacts at different levels—individual, group, institutional, national, global—each of which experiences the disaster differently in a kind of chain reaction. If, as many researchers have asserted, ‘disaster’ itself must be defined as a series of widening rings of social disruption, then it is fitting to consider war a subset of the set of all disasters in the nomenclature of recovery assistance. For the purposes of this investigation, no semantic distinction will be made between war and disaster.

Disaster is a process stemming from a combination of hazards, vulnerabilities, and pressures. These are related to the social and physical circumstances of a community; they may have their
roots in chronic cycles of poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, or political exploitation. These causes are often overlooked in favor of attributing a crisis to a single event—a mudslide, typhoon, fire, battle, etc. The most effective relief efforts proceed from an understanding of underlying factors and do not compound them.

Synthesis of Research

Following a review of several relevant studies, a handful of recurrent themes have been identified and briefly summarized below.

Reconstruction as Part of Development Continuum

A prominent scholar of post-war reconstruction has noted that “while disasters produce death, injury, heartbreaking economic loss, and widespread disruption, recovery from disaster should not be seen as a set of issues, decisions and events occurring in isolation from long-term trends in the community. The drama of the emergency and restoration periods fades, and the ongoing forces that produced the characteristics of the pre-disaster city re-emerge as the primary determinants of the city of the future.” The notion that recovery is part of a larger development narrative, and subject to the same forces that precipitated disaster, is borrowed as a fundamental assumption here.

Two important concepts follow: that measurable “disaster potential” is linked with local cycles of poverty and that the roots of poverty are nearly identical to the roots of vulnerability: lack of resources, failure of government to allocate resources fairly, shrinking land and economic opportunity in conjunction with rising populations, inordinate emphasis on technology and modernization, urbanization, increased disenfranchisement, expectations, unemployment, etc.

Comparative research suggests that inherent strengths, weaknesses, and liabilities of a community are amplified in the course of confronting a disaster:

In our case studies, we find strong evidence for acceleration of pre disaster trends in recovery. Simply stated, rapidly growing cities recover rapidly; stable, stagnant or declining cities recover slowly and may even have their decline accelerated.

These observations are not meant to discount the value of effective post-disaster response; relief agency activity is one important factor among several that affects overall recovery time. Cuny notes that agencies can directly affect the several variables which speed recovery— including the
clarity of policy and direction, collective motivation of participants, good communications, the availability of technical assistance, adequate cash flow, and the reuse of salvaged materials—as well as those which slow it, such as administrative delays, misappropriation of limited resources, and the solicitation or receipt of irrelevant aid.

Most disasters, regardless of their root causes, result in a recovery process with recognizable phases. The period immediately following a catastrophe is the emergency phase, devoted to rescue, assessment, and critical repairs to the infrastructure; the second phase is transitional, when residents return to normal patterns of work and social relations while permanent repairs to public utilities are undertaken; the final phase involves reconstruction, during which the final reordering of the community and its environment is conceived and accomplished. At the same time, a single disaster will affect different communities—and different sectors of the same community—in varied ways. Knowledge of pre-disaster social conditions and support structures can allow agencies to predict and prepare for the consequences of disaster that occur outside their sphere of influence.

Geipel goes further to outline the consequences of lackluster interventions in a worst-case scenario. It is posited that when the policies of intervening agencies for reconstruction are not defined, instruments for recovery not strictly applied, and incoming funds are diverted, the following results can be expected:

In the short-term (within 1 year), relief supplies are consumed by ‘first aid actions’ and seep away, along with the first wave of solidarity and public enthusiasm; projects proceed haphazardly with no master planning or guidance from above; subsidies promised never quite materialize, lost in financial power structures.

In the mid-term (2-5 years), donation of relief supplies dwindle as positive resonance among victims is difficult to perceive; central government and international relief organizations withdraw from disaster area; news of catastrophe and its results disappears from headlines; general apathy results while people wait for help from the outside and struggle with a poor flow of information.

In the longer-term (5-20 years), affected citizens are left to a free enterprise system of recuperation based on pre-disaster levels of wealth and connections to decision makers; local economy suffers; traditional bonds of trust between people and their leadership are severely strained; social ties and institutions must be mended without the benefit of prior needs assessment or coordinated planning.

This phasing scheme suggests that effective long-term disaster response planning must be viewed as a social rehabilitation process operating in the context of local development, not as a
program for the provision of material aid. Activation of the local economy and restitution of employment is frequently more important for disaster victims than material aid after the emergency phase. Relief agencies must recognize the hierarchy of community needs and address their efforts to the highest-ranking concerns possible. Every contribution and project should be planned and weighed in relation to these priorities and be synchronized with an appropriate phase of recovery; for instance, material contributions of food and clothing may be effective within weeks of a crisis but insulting if presented months later, when community focus has shifted towards the process of regaining self-sufficiency.

The length of each advanced phase can be typically expressed as a constant multiple of the length of the emergency phase, which reflects both disaster magnitude and the available societal resources. The speed of the entire process is predicated on levels of pre-war prosperity, the nature of damages suffered, and the quality of leadership devoted to reconstruction. More specifically, it has been shown by Kates and Pijawka’s longitudinal disaster relief studies that the duration of a reconstruction process (R) following the event of disaster is a function of the length of the emergency phase (E) such that

\[ t(R) = t(E) \times k \]

where \( k \) is a constant whole multiple related to local pre-disaster trends, the scale of damages suffered, and the resources available for recovery. While it is quite early to make any reliable analysis of the success of reconstruction procedures in Dubrovnik, which are still in an immature phase according to the theoretical models presented by Cuny et al, an assessment of the emergency phase will shed some light on the shape and character of later phases. Projects undertaken by local and international organizations in Dubrovnik will be examined and compared to the patterns already observed in the post-war and natural disaster relief case studies.

It follows that prompt intervention of outside agencies in the process of post-war recovery appears critical. Hesitation tends to erode trust in foreign agencies and forfeits the ability to influence tactical decision-making. Many habits are formed, for better or for worse, in the initial stages of reconstruction:

If you’re there immediately, I think a lot can be done. If it happens that you’re there waiting for two years…then the train will be leaving without you.
Reconstruction Economics Tied to Political Incentives

Rarely does a central government subsidize projects on principle; more often, reconstruction is tied to discernible political priorities. The simplest of these would be the belief that certain historic sites are strongly associated with patriotism and the national identity; when these monuments are threatened in war their rehabilitation strengthens morale during periods of transition. Middelburg, Warsaw, Coventry, Kuwait, and Dubrovnik all fall fairly cleanly into this category. A variant on this theme links reconstruction activities more generally with the image of a strong and resolute government, creating the impression that an organized, efficient, and still prosperous state has emerged from the vicissitudes of war. This is a kind of public relations governments are typically eager to subsidize whether or not it characterizes their administration well; it was a factor in Iraq (1992 and 2003), Beirut (1995), and Coventry (1945).

Propaganda is the instrument of this promotion, and recovery projects that have benefited from media attention are generally more successful than those that do not. Reconstruction in Coventry was stalled during the war; the project’s eventual success can be ascribed to the powers of effective post-war promotion of the city as a national symbol of hope, pride, camaraderie, etc. Similarly, positive publicity for the heroic effort of Warsaw’s planners insured support for the reconstruction and ongoing preferential treatment for the city as an icon of Polish resistance. American media exposure undoubtedly fostered international interest in the rehabilitation of Kabul following the fall of the Taliban.

What becomes of the relief efforts without national publicity campaigns, and those that receive negative publicity? Donor fatigue develops early in politically weak, relatively poor countries. Some observers note that international involvement in underdeveloped nations is conditioned on the need for immediate humanitarian assistance, a direct or indirect threat to the security of the donor nation, and the prospect of enhanced trade or commercial ventures with the recipient nation. If none of these conditions can be satisfied, international aid is not likely to appear. The power dynamics underlying post-war reconstruction, in conjunction with public perceptions shaped by the media, dictate the terms of project funding and support. Wealthy nations like Britain and Kuwait are bound only by the logistics of supply and demand; poorer nations should incorporate the expectation of delays and disappointments into their comprehensive plan.

Planners in Coventry isolated the problem of investment strategy well when they examined the problem of whose capital would do the rebuilding of retail/commercial centers. They realized that letting free market dictate the tempo and character of post-war development would mean
letting go of aesthetic controls, but government grants were soon to expire and local revenues could not meet all of the projected needs, so they faced “a rather unwelcome choice: they might either have to opt for a smaller, cheaper, more revenue-oriented scheme or call in private capital and thereby jeopardize the aesthetic and coordinated nature of the development.”17 Local authorities won additional support from London when they drew attention to the revenue-producing tourist potential of the restored site. Beirut’s Solidere confronted similar dilemmas without resorting to government support, as discussed later.

Reconstruction in Middelburg employed an orderly scheme of financing from the private sector, where property was allocated to private owners who were subsequently responsible for the costs of repairs specified by the master plan, as well as the legal obligations that went with it. Those who would benefit most from the revitalization of the city would assume the largest share of the costs; all residents were expected to contribute in some form.18

Familiarity with such market-driven, self-supporting system can be crucial. Foreign interest in the recovery of a community diminishes as it enters into the later stages of reconstruction, putting the implementation of long-term solution constantly out of reach of the NGO’s active there.19 Charitable funding mechanisms show a strong and sentimental bias towards the early phases of recovery and the physical aspects of reconstruction, prompting the cynical insiders’ slogan “No bombs, no money”; this unfortunate trend deserves further study. This logic is not in keeping with the findings of several longitudinal studies regarding the long-term effectiveness of reconstruction efforts, which call for increasingly incremental and sustained infusions of financial support across all major phases of recovery.

It has also been noted that infusions of foreign aid can have numerous unintended negative impacts: fostering of unequal or negative growth; exacerbation of competition in an environment of acute scarcity; abrupt shifts in local income and wealth; increasing resources available to continue the conflict; discouraging local organization s, anticipating foreign support based on acute need, to assume fiscal responsibilities or reveal their full capacity; disrupting local economies.20 Accordingly, it is not unusual to find that aid aggravates the same tensions it is meant to assuage.

Successful reconstruction is characterized by decreasing levels of external manpower and funding over time. While higher levels may be beneficial in the short-term, the longer they remain in place, the more difficult it will be to achieve a successful reconstruction.21
Disaster relief should be more than an international charity drive. Research indicates clearly that local skills and materials alone can sometimes rebuild a community when properly identified and managed. Sound management includes thorough conceptualization of community needs and project goals, the provision of an ongoing framework for shared decision making and management, exploration and presentation of all available options for revitalization, development of incremental and flexible budgets which take into account unstable, inflationary economic conditions. Agencies must also remain aware of their own institutional limitations in terms of authority, energy, political support, and expert capabilities; planning should be oriented to the strengths of the interveners and the community being served.

**Retention v. Upgrade**

A common tendency in the realm of post-war reconstruction is to skirt what appear to be ephemeral concerns in favor of high-visibility projects promising speedy, palpable results. While these projects boost community morale and lend immediate credibility to implementing agencies, their benefits are often short-lived. When it becomes obvious that the momentum cannot be sustained and that sacrifices must be made by local residents, enthusiasm wanes. It is at these times—following the emergency phase, when cooperation and funding begin to diminish—that the functional well being of the city demands the attention of relief professionals.

Successful post-war recovery efforts recognize war as a crisis of associations, in which the psychological well being and civic identity of a community is threatened as the built environment is destroyed. Often this destruction is calculated by aggressors who wish to inflict a special kind of suffering upon the native population tied to campaigns of demoralization, demographic engineering, and political demystification.

The example of Dresden shows how a politically crippled nation and traumatized local community confronted the loss of a treasured historic city. A major cultural center before WW2, approximately 85% of the town was destroyed by allied bombing in 1945. German authorities attempted to reconstruct traditional facades and structures in the historic quarters, resulting in an imprecise imitation of the original streetscapes “whose representational pretension was in total contradiction to the social and economic reality in the GDR.” It can be assumed that the effort and expense of an anachronistic rebuilding program was weighed in relation to intangible public benefits tied to sentimental associations with the affected monuments.
Polish officials made a similar judgment regarding the devastated central core of Warsaw, and pursued their intention to reconstruct the Old Town with astonishing determination. Throughout the German siege Warsaw’s ‘soldier-architects’ protected historic documentation and designed plans for reconstruction even while the buildings were collapsing around them. The power and vitality of the city was proven after the war when thousands of residents returned from the countryside to an urban landscape literally reduced to rubble. Their collective efforts, beginning from nothing, eventually restored the original appearance of inner Warsaw through a program of arduous research and reconstruction. In 1946 a writer for The Warsaw Escarpment attempted to explain why a return to architectural prototypes seemed so essential:

If the Warsaw community is to be reborn, if its core is to be constituted by former Warsawians, then they have to be given back their old rebuilt Warsaw to some extent, so that they can see in it the same city, though considerably altered, and not a different town on the same spot. One must take into consideration the fact that individual attachment to old forms is a factor of social unity.

It is also possible that Hitler’s well-documented intentions to build a new town on ruins of Warsaw made the resurrection of Poland’s capitol a necessary demonstration of defiance and resilience. Warsaw addressed the post-war crisis of civic identity head on, literally resurrecting the spaces and symbols of its past; other victims of war in Europe did not have that luxury.

In 1940 Orléans, France was largely destroyed by fires as German soldiers advanced towards Paris. One resident asked upon finding his home town in ruins, “What was left of the Chancellery, of the rue Royale, of the rue Tabor, of everything that gave Orléans charm and honour?” The architecture which had so long been a silent witness to the life of the town was gone, and its embodiment of the community had been so complete that its fabric had become inseparable from the social values it once reflected. In keeping with the aggressor’s intentions, something had been taken which was extremely difficult to replace. Many towns would subsequently struggle with the problem of how to respond to such a loss in practical and effective ways.

Post-war planners in Middelburg, Holland, sought to reify to the ‘vernacular norms’ which had dictated the streetscapes of the historic quarter before the town was bombed in 1940. Guided by what was considered the ‘typical Middelburg atmosphere’ in an attempt to restore the symbolic effects of Dutch architecture, designers rejected facsimiles for a loose interpretation of indigenous styles. City officials also preferred “the flexibility and political feasibility of traditionalism” to contemporary design and the painstaking process of accurate reconstruction. Their intention to evoke the image of a model city resurrected after war was not realized; the designs were generally regarded as lifeless and inauthentic with respect to the past and poor responses to residential needs.
with respect to the present. Despite its long-term failure, the recovery process was an exercise of resistance and pride for the nation.

In the course of post-war recovery, cities like these came to realize that bombardment of civilian centers inflicts wounds upon a nation’s morale which are slow to heal. They grappled with the essential qualities of historic sites in the search for organized responses:

From one day to the next, in half of the cities in Europe, the romantic ruins of classic antiquity were mixed together with the modern ruins of war. For the first time in our country, the sophisticated and cerebral preoccupations of a few enlightened spirits to conserve the testimonies of an immense artistic heritage was replaced by the anguish of the common people when they saw not only their often modest homes, but also their spiritual and cultural patrimony destroyed.

Infliction of indirect damages on a populace through aerial bombardment of cultural centers became part of orthodox military strategy after the winter of 1942. Undertaken with great precision by two of Europe’s most antiquarian nations, this wicked precedent echoes across many subsequent conflicts up to the present. Increasingly, the effects of war would be tallied in terms this kind of ‘anguish’ as cultural sites routinely became targets. Accordingly, strategies for recovery in such cases must be developed with the psychological needs of the affected community as a central concern.

Often the destruction of cities wrought by war is viewed by planners as an opportunity to improve and revise them. The aftermath of WW2 coincided with the popularity of the urban renewal movement in Europe, where the links between urban structure and social welfare were investigated with unprecedented interest and optimism. Architects during this period frequently approached post-war reconstruction with a mind to redress a site’s prewar ills or reconfigure it completely with new emphasis on modern convenience, health, amenity, zoning, etc. Planning which repeated outmoded urban forms was regarded with increasing disdain in this period, and new theoretical approaches promised “no less than the well housed, socially acceptable, environmentally attractive city, to replace the outmoded, unhealthy, over-congested city of the past.” After the war, urban designers rushed to test these notions in the cities ravaged by the war.

One writer observes that, in light of this general enthusiasm, “when the bombs fell, it was no wonder that reconstruction groups from Warsaw to Coventry sprang up within days with practical schemes for the rebuilding of their cities.” Function-oriented goals of urban renewal frequently competed with the public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details. Professionals in charge of recovery had to balance these disparate agendas. Warsaw planners struck a rather rigid
bargain; permission to replicate the historic urban core was effectively traded for the simultaneous
development of the outer industrial bands according to updated economic models which completely
re configured the functional zones of the city with minimal concession to preexisting patterns.
The reconstruction plan for Coventry, where 90% of urban core was damaged during an 11 hour
Luftwaffe raid in 1940, addressed the ills which had plagued it before the war while it confronted
extensive losses. In the years leading up the raid, a rapidly expanding working class had overtaxed
the city’s infrastructure and poor zoning practices had largely eliminated open public spaces; during
this time the Labor party had campaigned successfully on a reform platform specifically directed at
city planning. Given a chance to implement their policies on Coventry’s ‘clean slate,’ a new city was
subsequently designed around principles centered on users and functions, not the remaining urban
fabric. The success of this approach placed Coventry “in the center of complimentary discourses
celebrating planning and anticipating the shape of an improved postwar world” and was accepted as
a model for recovery planning in other European cities with similar prewar conditions.29

Planners pressed urban renewal to its conceptual limit in their designs for reconstruction in
Hamburg, Germany, bombarded in 1943 by Allied forces. True to some of their destructive
programs underway in occupied territories at the time, German designers attempted to negate all
historic tradition with renewal based on the “eternal” traits of local topography:

[In Hamburg] urban planning somehow completed the destruction of the urban
centers. The experience of the aerial warfare and of the Third Reich created an
invincible faith in a better future, as if a look back into history would allow only
a look into an unfathomable pit.30

This pit, in the case of many damaged cities, appeared to harbor numerous ‘unhealthy’ elements; the
threats they posed were interpreted broadly in social and political terms. Because they believed that
contaminated housing produced a politically radicalized and biologically weakened working class,
one writer noted that these planners “almost welcomed the destruction of the metropolis as an
already ‘dead’ social form of human organization.”31 They were the authors of recovery schemes
that advocated total dislocation and severance with the past: abandoning the bombed sites, plowing
over the rubble, and starting new cities elsewhere.

Post-war reconstruction is often fraught with tension between popular nostalgia and professional
ambition. Each camp believes its expectations are most in keeping with the trajectory of pre-war
urban development. When present, both need to be acknowledged as implementation of recovery
activities proceeds.
Utilization of Local Coping Mechanisms

Because theoretical approaches to post-war reconstruction are generally formulated from the point of view of an intervener, there is a tendency for agencies to underestimate the value of local resources and adopt a polarized—if benevolent—framework in which to understand their relationship with the local community, expressed in terms of victims and providers, amateurs and experts, or passive and active participants.

Cuny notes how this polarity can generate distrust and discourage public participation, greatly decreasing the potency of relief efforts. Members of the affected community should be treated as the clients, not simply the beneficiaries, of intervening agencies.\(^{32}\)

The intention to help relieve disaster-related distress is not enough to insure success, regardless of the resources applied to agency projects; a strict and diligent commitment to locally sustainable solutions is also necessary. Without it, relief programs can become self-defeating:

...many agencies have a very unsophisticated view of relief operations, and many feel that because they are trying to do good work, the impact cannot be negative. In most cases, this is the most restricting factor: failure of the agencies to look beyond what appears to be self-evident and to explore in-depth the impact of their programs...unless mechanisms are developed to hold interveners accountable to the victims, post-disaster programs will continue to have only limited and mostly negative impact.\(^{33}\)

Mechanisms must allow for review and revision of these programs by local authorities. Communities should be encouraged to express their demands prior to implementation and exercise significant control in the management of projects. Success can be measured in relation to an agency’s contributions to the community: the alleviation of suffering or burdens, the strengthening of local coping mechanisms, a shortening of the period between emergency and full recovery, fostering a sense of safety, etc.

But an inherent tension exists where foreign intervention meets local initiative; the risks of undermining local coping mechanisms and creating destructive dependencies has already been mentioned. Often the meeting becomes a strained dialog between theory and pragmatism, the ideal and the real. Ample opportunity for misinterpretation, disappointment, and insensitivity makes the prospect of intervention daunting from the outset, if the forewarnings of disaster response studies are trusted. The post-war scenario is substantially more complicated, and conventional wisdom suggests that outsiders should wait until warring factions have settled their differences before attempting to assess local needs or offer guidance. No such logic would hold
for natural disaster response; although the aftermath of an earthquake is unstable and chaotic, the value of timely aid is widely acknowledged.

A special exception is frequently made for war-related disaster, where the political character of the crisis becomes a pretext for restraint on the part of agencies concerned with cultural heritage. Some organizations are only too willing to exempt their resources and efforts from what may appear to be a bottomless pit of unrest and violence. Once this mistaken premise is corrected, disaster response can be conditioned not on the causes of a crisis, but on its results.

The scale of damages, the need for specialized advice, and the weakness of native response mechanisms caused by warfare usually make external support for recovery necessary. When the problem is divided appropriately, all interested relief agencies can adopt portions of the work which suit their strengths and degree of commitment. Numerous forms of provisional involvement can be undertaken safely by international agencies from the moment cultural sites are threatened. Interim planning can form the basis of more permanent reconstruction efforts later on.

Funding may be a low priority for reconstruction efforts despite local scarcity. Research suggests that the strength of personal leadership at the local level determines the availability of resources, given a reliable base of knowledge. One observer has noted that in sensitive post-war scenarios professionals should act as “people, not specialists” in light of special psychological circumstances which do not allow for orthodox approaches. Expertise must be joined with an empathetic involvement with the community affected by disaster.

It is incumbent upon foreign agencies participating in the recovery process to recognize the functional units, both public and private, of the affected community. If the local coping mechanisms are ignored, local authorities may be undermined and a harmful dependency on foreign aid could be formed. One study remarks:

The disaster and the havoc that it causes form only one part of the picture. The ways in which agencies respond to disasters and the implication of that response for the development of the affected countries are of major concern, for inappropriate responses, constituting a second disaster, occur frequently.

The recovery methods which are non-disruptive to the community should be adopted by outside interveners. A failure to embrace them often erodes faith in local remedies and paralyzes local incentive with an ongoing expectation of aid. Cuny’s thorough analysis lays heavy emphasis
on the perils of paternalism stemming from an incomplete understanding of local systems and hasty infusions of support:

Certainly a demonstration of massive response points to the inadequacy of the local government and its agencies; and the more decision making that is removed from the local community, the more the feeling of helplessness is accentuated.

Outside organizers of relief and revitalization have to work hard simply to avoid becoming a further detriment to the affected community.

The necessity of integrated, cooperative approaches to disaster recovery planning is a recurrent theme in the research literature. It is of equal importance to post-war planning. Because the need for foreign assistance implies a relationship of dependency at the outset of recovery, shared decision-making practices become crucial. Relationships between insiders and outsiders must be clearly and properly delimited: to the degree practicable, foreign interveners should assume a subordinate role to local authority and the plans they introduce should complement existing site-based processes. Neither they, nor the aid they provide, should compete with local hierarchies or economies.38

Many essential services do not require funding and can only be provided locally. One Dubrovnik architect suggested that her work after the war illuminated the human realities of her situation and how her training could address them:

I am a social worker. I have to have a very good understanding of individual necessity and social necessity in order to make good architecture.39

It is useful to view every aspect of post-war revitalization as a form of social work, where problems must be solved using the language of relationships, meanings, and lifestyles in order to be considered effective. Architects, economists, engineers, and conservators working in the realm of post-war reconstruction will be called upon in this way to unite the moral and material components of problems they address.

The ideal reconstruction plan would rely exclusively on local professionals in the allied building and preservation fields since they possess the most intimate knowledge of affected sites and can maintain a consistent presence on site. Foreign interveners who wish to augment a local reconstruction team should research the academic programs operating prior to the war and assess the professional base at the local level before assigning their own representatives to a project. Often, local professionals have left the town in search of employment elsewhere or to enter military service, further depleting the base of knowledge and technical capacity. Local
claims to the contrary should not hinder foreign agencies from recommending that outside reinforcements be employed to assure a well-rounded effort. This dilemma is best resolved through cross-cultural training missions and a vigorous, systematic exchange of professional knowledge.

The need for rapid, large scale response to wartime disaster generally requires the immediate involvement of central governmental authority in the recovery process. The most successful recovery plans allow for this authority--lopsided during the emergency phase--to be eventually shared with local agencies which will carry out the majority of long-term projects. A power balance is necessary for public acceptance of the program: central government can insure continuity and local administrators can respond more directly to community needs throughout the process of reconstruction.

Recovering communities face a different challenge when central governmental authority has been severely weakened or distracted by the war. In Dresden, reconstruction plans suffered continually during the postwar years due to instability on a national level following Germany’s capitulation: the political and legal frameworks necessary for large-scale reconstruction were not made available until 1949, when authority was centralized with the Ministry for Reconstruction was given the right of free expropriation of formerly private property. Instability and uncertainty continued to hinder comprehensive efforts, however, as occupying governments pursued divergent recovery policies within their respective sectors and government funding was diverted to war reparations. In Warsaw, Soviet sponsorship of recovery activities after the war resulted in a vexing trade-off: the historic quarter was restored at the expense of the other sections of the city – dismissed at the time as worthless monuments to bourgeois values--which were demolished in advance of large projects tied to the newly centralized socialist economy. The values of a ruling political party or reconstruction patron are inevitably reflected in the character of post-war reconstruction.

Many studies have recommended that the most successful post-disaster plans are centered on local human needs and engineered according to local capacities in order to sustain long-term progress. Isolated restoration projects undertaken by foreign agencies that do not strengthen local self-reliance are frequently counter-productive, and foreign aid not used to leverage other funds or rebuild regional revenue-producing activity yields disappointing results. Any schemes for recovery initiated by foreign interveners, regardless of how carefully formulated or executed, will prove inadequate if they fail to engage the public which they serve through direct involvement, and ultimately, through the transfer of responsibility.
The preceding concerns point to an overarching rule for post-disaster interventions: repair local systems first, and allow these to sustain long-term reconstruction. The health of communities, social functions, political mechanisms, and industries should be attended to before individual sites are addressed. A systems approach avoids idiosyncratic and uncoordinated projects which squander resources and undermine public confidence in the recovery process. Davis emphasizes this notion further when he suggests that the planning system should be the first item to be reviewed by recovery officials given “the very much more demanding context of reconstruction planning.” Other researchers have pointed to the fallacy, implied here, of the uncritical implementation of procedures and policies developed during peacetime in a post-war scenario.

**Adequate Access to Information & Resources**

In many cases, foreign professionals with access to major libraries may have more pertinent information at their disposal than on-site officials in a war-torn area. This imbalance may be rectified with the judicious use of the telecommunications media and selective reproduction of key documents by outside agents. This cooperative approach to information gathering was used to protect endangered cultural assets during WW2, when the American Defense-Harvard Group and the American Council of Learned Societies prepared over 800 maps for Allied ground and air forces indicating the location of art collections, monuments, and archives to be protected. It is difficult to underestimate the importance of rapid access to reliable, complete documentation in areas outside of routine supervision, where inhabitants will generate their own solutions to reconstruction problems in the absence of timely, coordinated action.

Access to precedent studies and current professional research publications is generally limited during the crucial post-conflict planning period due to weakened transportation and communication links. While information flows easily towards American and European audiences, the stream inwards towards local reconstruction authorities is often choked, though this comparative material would improve the quality of recovery planning:

...more knowledge...I would appreciate any more experience concerning the job I am doing...seeing the monuments which have been restored, either in a bad way or a good way, to see the experiences around the world is the most important thing.

Available methods and technologies for information transfer have yet to be fully exploited in most post-conflict scenarios though they hold out a promise of higher standards for project
management and implementation. Insofar as information can enable recovery officials to strategize efficiently and locate sources of support on a continuous basis, it is more valuable than money.

The availability of money, materials, and labor is central to successful revitalization. Availability is rarely an issue in the context of peace and political stability, but numerous challenges arise in the aftermath of war for the officials managing recovery. They must often ‘sell’ their project to international relief agencies, foundations, foreign governments, or private donors in order to secure the resources which are not available locally. Disaster recovery research shows that the provision of international aid rapidly decreases following the emergency phase of relief, and private foundations suffer from “donor fatigue” when regional tensions create long-term demands on philanthropic sources after the conflict has disappeared from the headlines.44 A thorough understanding of these trends should help to break up local dependencies on foreign aid, and recommend more active solutions to the problem of project funding. Appropriate methods of commercial solicitation which are familiar to observers of market-based economies may not be obvious to local authorities where disaster occurs. In some cases the language of investment and finance must be learned quickly in response to the specific needs of reconstruction, including mastery of intricate real estate financing, cost benefit analysis, and marketing research that can unlock investment potential and generate income to support reconstruction in low profile districts.45

Despite a large body of research, Geipel has noted several problems which hamper reliable assessment of long-term recovery patterns in disaster areas. Most studies, it is observed, fail to discuss the social and political conditions leading up to the disaster event and thereby forfeit critical insights which might inform the recovery process. Longitudinal studies are rare due to the impatience of researchers and the logistic difficulties of organizing such work. When multiple lateral examples are compared, the information collected for any one event is often too thin to sustain rigorous comparisons.

It is suggested that the necessary long-term studies are rare because “research in the Anglo-American context has a short attention span and jumps from event to event. As long as the media dwell on a certain disaster, funds flow freely and research pays off.” One interesting aspect of this difficulty stems from the perceptions of graduate students who conduct much of the field research. Geipel points out that they are motivated by overt conditions of poverty, destruction, and distress to travel and work in disaster areas, but are unlikely to devote
themselves to longitudinal research projects which revisit areas already re-stabilized and in advanced stages of recovery. As a result, it is suggested, the paucity of research data in these later phases makes the search for “applicable regularities and strategies for dealing with future catastrophes” unusually difficult.46

Recovery benefits from the work of relief agencies that take advantage of the lessons from the past and available information pertaining to local conditions. When this background material is ignored, delay and inconsistency can erode public confidence in a post-war climate already prone to widespread cynicism and complacency.

Case Studies

The preceding section explored some key concepts regarding effective post-war reconstruction that emerged from recent studies. Below, a new set of issues is introduced through brief review of six case studies. A comparison of Coventry and Dubrovnik has been made to demonstrate to show the special constrains of short, medium, and long-term reconstruction efforts; a comparison of Beirut and Mostar has been made to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of different institutional actors in the reconstruction process; a comparison of Warsaw and Belfast has been made to demonstrate how the effectiveness of any single post-conflict reconstruction strategy depends on the type of conflict that precipitated disaster.

Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Phase

Successful short-term responses to post-war recovery needs do not always translate into successful long-term development strategies. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Coventry (1941-1962) and Dubrovnik (1993-1999) will bear out a few important pitfalls and faulty assumptions.

Coventry

The post-war redevelopment of Coventry took place approximately between 1941 and 1962, when the new cathedral was consecrated. Coventry was the victim of one of the most devastating aerial attacks of the early phase of World War II; on 14 November 1940, it suffered the first of two major aerial bombardments which destroyed much of the existing city center and damaged two thirds of the city’s housing stock. During this raid, 449 German bombers dropped around 500 tons of high explosives and more than 40,000 incendiary bombs. As a result 975 buildings in the city center were damaged within a core area of 223 acres.47 Overnight Coventry became the most devastated city in England.
The prospect of large-scale urban renewal preceded the war. Throughout the 1930s Coventry prospered along with the automotive industry, but its rapid expansion during this period resulted in traffic congestion and urban blight in the commercial core. A local newspaper complained that the city was experiencing “an era of commercial revolution allied with civic stagnation... generations of bad planning” and asserted that “the trouble saved up for the future from an unimaginative past must be tackled.”48 An urban renewal scheme reflecting Modernist ambitions entitled *Coventry of Tomorrow* was presented in May 1940 by a team of local urban planners and architects.

Six months later these ambitious drawings were revisited to guide the reconstruction of a city that had become nearly unrecognizable to its inhabitants. Early in 1941, the scheme was again presented to the public as a *Plan for the New Coventry: Disorder and Destruction: Order and Design*—a pamphlet reprinted from an article in Architect and Building News. It has been noted that soon after “the rubble was cleared the City Architect and the Council were not slow to publicize the positive aspect of the blitz and grasp the fact that the bombing had presented them with a clean canvas on which to build a new city.”49 The plan was well-received by most authorities and professionals in England; it was published as a booklet entitled *The Future Coventry* in 1945 and included a set of guidelines for implementation. With many amendments and exclusions, this vision of rebuilt Coventry authored by Donald Gibson became the master plan that gave shape to the contemporary city.

The project embraced the heavy-handed and utopian ethic of Modernist principles that stressed, order, separation of civic functions, hygiene, and a self-conscious break with historic building strategies. Coventry’s post-war planners emphasized the virtues of swift, large-scale reconstruction, enticing the public with futuristic, idealized images offered in sharp contrast with photos illustrating...
deficiencies of the pre-war city, especially the dilapidated historic fabric and areas beset with chronic congestion, pollution and ugliness.

The damages wrought by the Luftwaffe were described with increasing ambivalence; the raid seemed to have created an opportunity for Coventry to reinvent itself and correct problems that had plagued the city for centuries. The planners’ scheme promised an “aesthetically and morally ordered Modern townscape” and seemed to capture the popular desire for palpable revitalization, disengagement from a traumatic past, and reassurance for a bright future.

Those promises were only partly kept. The massive funded needed to undertake such sweeping changes was slow to materialize; during this lull immediately following the war, the residents of Coventry were able to take a closer look at the forthcoming changes and discovered that not all of them were welcome. Many familiar landmarks and streets had disappeared and were not to be restored; older parts of the city considered unhealthy, unsightly, or inefficient by urban planners were fondly remembered by local residents. The new Coventry that emerged brought many disappointments, as pre-war residents felt their disorientation deepened and lamented the loss of familiar, salvageable structures that did not fit modernized zoning requirements or aesthetic criteria.

A dense, organic city with a strong medieval character prior to the war, today Coventry is associated with lifeless and drab public spaces hemmed in by austere, homogenized structures. While master planner Gibson lamented that his spatial prescriptions failed due to a popular fixation on “dogs, cinema, pubs and speedway”, one resident noted: “They kept putting little flower plots and raised beds—but it was only to break up the concrete. It was a concrete city center.”
Coventry demonstrates how popular reconstruction plans, when generated quickly by a small number of like-minded professionals in the absence of significant public consultation, can backfire. The Coventry scheme seems to have failed simultaneously in several ways: it was grounded on assumptions about the city’s growth and the social behavior of its residents that were not reliable, it buried a past that still had psychological value to local communities, and it imposed a highly integrated urban aesthetic that owed more to fashion than to pragmatism. While early phases of reconstruction planning played effectively upon the intensified emotional climate of the immediate post-war period, gaining support from all quarters, the late phases of implementation were often met with skepticism and disappointment. Coventry seems to offer an warning against hasty, dogmatic, broad stroke programs for post-war reconstruction.

**Dubrovnik**

As the former Yugoslavia was drawn and quartered by ethno-nationalist political entrepreneurs, while political strategies were played out on the national and international levels, a punishment was conceived by Serbian politicians for Croatia after it decided to leave the federation; a military strategy of intimidation and repeated close-range shelling was implemented in and around the Commune of Dubrovnik. Mortar attacks from the sea, undertaken by the Yugoslav National Navy out of its home port in the nearby Bay of Kotor, occurred on October 23 and 24, November 8 and 13, and December 6 of 1991, continuing on May 25, 29, 30, and 31 and June 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 17, and 20 of 1992. Some fire was returned by *ad hoc* Croatian forces from the Napoleonic fortress on Srd mountain overlooking the Old City and the harbor, to little effect. In the course of these episodes, approximately 2000 light artillery rounds registered 314 direct hits to historic property within the city walls, resulting in the destruction of nine buildings by fire. In total, 68% of the 824 structures of the Old City were affected; the majority of damages were to the clay tile roof fabrics of densely packed residences.
When the navy retreated and the last fires were put out in the historic city, 43 civilian deaths had been incurred.

The case of post-war reconstruction Dubrovnik is in many ways much more straightforward than the Coventry example just examined. Where urban planners in Coventry made the mistake of planning too much too soon it was too little input, planners in Dubrovnik to not have the option to pursue such ambitious and totalizing postwar reconstruction schemes. Instead, they spend the initial recovery. Waiting for international assistance and taking care of immediate survival needs with very limited local resources. Because Dubrovnik had been such an important tourist destination for so many decades prior to the outbreak of ethnic conflict in 1992, and because it had been included for years on the World Heritage List, many inside the city assumed that their fair weather friends and investors would it return during their time of greatest need to assist the city in the process of rebuilding itself physically and socially.

This assumption turned out to be wrong. It was years before any significant and coordinated foreign aid reached Dubrovnik, long after many of the most pressing reconstruction issues had already been addressed in a piecemeal fashion.

Dubrovnik during bombardment (l-r): harbor fires, residential loss due to incendiary bombs, church damage, main pedestrian axis.

A sentimental fondness for the historic sites of the Balkans, fostered during peacetime in light of friendly and lucrative international relations, proved insufficient to gather international support during the critical phases of local crisis in Dubrovnik:

The superficiality of our infatuation has been exposed…Behind a torn-up postcard, the City surfaced as distant and utterly abandoned. At once, it became clear that it had been alone for a long time, and that for years, it had lived misunderstood, in an unhappy marriage with its inhabitants and neglected by its extended family, pushed into a pretty but faded memento of an entire nation.53

When aid did arrive, it often appeared inappropriate or superficial. One good example was the donation of tens of thousands of terra cotta roof tiles from the French government in 1994. Most of the historic buildings in the walled city had lost all or part of their roofs, and all of those roofs were tiled; still, the French tiles were of a color and shape quite different from the distinctive Dubrovnik ones—famous for their golden color and fluted vertical profile—so that the donated tiles stood out visually in an unforeseen way and made patching difficult, since the old and new modules did not fit together well. Today, it is easy to appreciate the French contribution from any rooftop, but the overall effect suggests hastiness, or insensitivity, or both.

Funding efforts for reconstruction in Dubrovnik serve as an illustration of the pitfalls of a non-systems approach. The scattered and intermittent flow of donations into the Old City has been previously mentioned, and portends numerous undesirable results: planning oriented to earmarked moneys; inordinate emphasis on the structures of the Old Town due to lop-sided media exposure; project development tied to an unstable federal budgetary allowance; vulnerability to quick, lucrative development schemes, etc. Currently the reconstruction budget is bound to forces which cannot be easily predicted or controlled. Recovery funding beyond the emergency phase should be centered around a system of self-sustaining income managed on the local level; in the case of Dubrovnik, the obvious generators are real estate and small-scale tourism.
In several senses, the reconstruction process in Dubrovnik was the inverse of what transpired in Coventry 50 years prior. The early stages in Dubrovnik were uncoordinated, week, under-funded, and undertaken outside of any master planning framework but the later stages demonstrated the value of local initiative and competence that grew during those first difficult years following the cessation of hostilities. Having created or improved local mechanisms through which large-scale reconstruction projects could be implemented, Croatian authorities were in good position to orchestrate the ongoing projects required to return to some kind of normal state of civic affairs. In addition, though difficult, lack of large-scale external support for construction activities forced reconstruction to proceed incrementally and with significant local input; though perhaps unintentional, this slower and halting process they have generated superior results when compared to the highly conceptual and bureaucratized approaches used in places like Coventry. There, spectacular early plans envisioned later gave way to disappointing results in an abiding impression that more cooks in that reconstruction kitchen might have improved the soup.

Dubrovnik demonstrates the value of restoring healthy local systems in the post-war scenario; though sluggish and ambivalent foreign donor agencies, by their absence in the immediate post-war recovery period, did not intend to contribute to these systems, the long-term benefits of their non-action is now apparent. By design or by neglect, leaving communities with usable tools and training may constitute the highest form of external assistance.

Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Agency

Effectiveness of post-war reconstruction depends on the coordinating agent’s relationship to the problems and local community. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Beirut (1990-present) and Mostar (1995-present) will illustrate the distinct merits and weaknesses of rebuilding programs guided by market forces and the non-profit sector, respectively.
Beirut

Though very few comprehensive or reliable studies have been undertaken in Lebanon regarding the impacts of the war since its conclusion, a number of scholars have attempted to estimate losses incurred by Lebanese society since the outbreak of hostilities in 1975. Of a pre-war population estimated at around 4 million, it is possible that Lebanon lost as many as 150,000 of its citizens over 16 years of civil war. Two or three times that number were probably wounded during the same period. Because the number of paramilitary combatants never exceeded a few tens of thousands, is clear that the loss of civilian noncombatants was astonishingly high. In addition to the casualties directly associated with it inter-ethnic violence, some estimates suggest that as many as 700,000 Lebanese were displaced due to intimidation, property loss, and shifting territorial acquisitions between rival ethnic groups, leaving the post-war population in 1993 at 2.7 million—less than three-quarters of the prewar level. According to every index imaginable, the civil war was catastrophic for the country and 15 years later, the process of reconstruction is ongoing.

What happens when not even a dysfunctional local government exists to provide a platform for professional intervention? When municipal authorities are severely weak or disorganized, active professionals must turn to other institutional frameworks. An interesting surrogate for municipal authority is private investment. Deference to market forces allows experts once again to view their involvement as neutral and non partisan—guided by the invisible hand of economics rather than and discrete political agenda.

A near-perfect example of this approach is found in Beirut, where the creation of Solidere as a guiding force for post-war urban reconstruction marked a symbolic abandonment of government agencies in favor of private enterprise. Solidere attracted the best professional talent, foreign and native, to the city with a clear set of objectives, ample funds, and an innovative business model—all standing in sharp contrast to national and municipal offices that appeared demoralized, disorganized, and decrepit by comparison. This ambitious undertaking provides a model for market-driven interventions that provides another set of insights regarding how built environment professionals can intervene in the divided city context without appearing to give up their impartiality.

In the spring of 1994, a red line was drawn around the core of Beirut’s ruined central business district and the entire parcel—including the most valuable real-estate in the city—was put up for sale on the international market. The process was engineered and managed by the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District (henceforth
“Solidere”) with anchoring capital investment and a blessing from then-Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. This tax-exempt, joint-stock corporation was made up of property rights holders and investors holding stock in the downtown area. Possession of shares was determined by pre-war ownership or cash subscription in U.S. dollars. Solidere’s shares are also traded on the secondary stock market under the supervision of the Bank of Lebanon and in conjunction with 32 Lebanese financial restitutions. From this point forward physical reconstruction in Beirut would be largely synonymous with the activities of Solidere, which was given sole proprietary authority over all decision-making related to physical reconstruction inside the red line.

Relinquishing a highly contested urban territory to the vagaries of market forces was unprecedented. The ultimate success of Beirut’s experiment has yet to be determined. For certain, Solidere is an interesting hybrid of tradition and innovation. Drawing upon Beirut’s reputation as the entrepreneurial and secular capital of the Middle East, the investment-driven model for postwar reconstruction is in close keeping with the character of the city and appears aggressively pragmatic. Opportunity and risk are distributed across a wide, international spectrum of investors and over a lengthy implementation timetable generated by a comprehensive preliminary plan. Largely bypassing local favorites and rivals, all major architectural design commissions were tied to international competitions intended to attract unimpeachable professional talent and raise the profile of the project as a whole with celebrity designers.

By tying the process the physical recovery to profit motives and the unit value of widely held stock, incentives were distributed in a manner that minimized local political influences. For exactly the same reason, responsiveness to the concerns and expectations of local residents was dramatically reduced. While the central business district received the lion’s share of investment professional attention, the remainder of Beirut—the vast majority of the city and its residents—remained relatively stagnant. Determined to maximize return on investment for Solidere
shareholders, in house urban planners, architects and conservators designed a utopian enclave tailored primarily to the expectations of an international corporate elite.

Critics of the project grew bolder and more organized throughout the late 1990’s, lamenting the replacement of the Green Line separating ethnic factions with Solidere’s red line separating economic classes. Advocates cited the trickle-down economic benefits of concentrated institutional investment and asserted that the complex incentives propelling private investment allowed revitalization to proceed at a fraction of the time and cost that would have been required if the job had been left to Lebanon’s crippled public institutions.

A decade after its first stock offering on the open market, Solidere’s achievements from the standpoint of physical rehabilitation in the central business district are nothing short of astonishing. New construction proceeded a rapid rate and in accordance with exceedingly high standards for design and infrastructure. The technical dimensions of project planning and coordination have largely been impeccable, demonstrated by the consistently high quality of new buildings and public spaces. The built environment professionals responsible for this work emphasize that they have created an economically viable downtown to lead the economic revitalization of Beirut as a whole, upon which the economic fortunes of the country largely rest. They claim to have reconstructed it a mult-ethnic social arena physically and symbolically reconnecting pieces of the city that were severed during the course of inter ethnic hostilities.

Though downtown Beirut has now been transformed into an enclave for corporate tenants, its engineers promise that substantial benefits will be spun off to all Beirutis once the rehabilitation project is completed and full tenancy has been achieved.

When judged according to strictly cosmetic and economic criteria, and simultaneously limiting our view to the city’s historic core, Solidere’s daring open heart surgery in Beirut has been successful. No hint of infection is visible within the largely rebuilt downtown that sparkles with rehabilitated nostalgia and an undeniably youthful vigor. A handful of historic landmark buildings have been meticulously preserved along with the permanent exposure of an
archaeological site possibly dating to the Phoenician period. Beirut’s central business district presents the image of a fully recovered financial capital ready to do business in the international arena. There is little doubt that some of its well-heeled tenants are poised to guide the city towards a prosperous future.

But Solidere’s critics are quick to point out that these tenants bear little resemblance to the diverse array of occupants living and working in the downtown area prior to the war:

I’m not taken by the great effort for physical beauty and the renovation of Allenby street. I don’t accept the city without its people. There were 130,000 people living there from all confessions and all classes of society, which is equally important: from craftsmen to very rich professionals. It was a bulging society.\(^5\)

Other critics believe that excessive demolition accompanied Solidere’s renewal scheme in order to meet density and revenue benchmarks, underscoring the tension built into “the logic of Solidere” between historic preservation and real estate development on the open market:

The more they destroy, the more they make a profit. The more they throw people out, the more they make profit.\(^5\)

Solidere’s leadership contends that they have done Beirut a favor by improving a downtown area that was, in the aftermath of the war, “…a slum, a destroyed area with no infrastructure”.\(^5\)

Solidere’s critics meanwhile complained about the unnecessary demolition of historic fabric that did not meet the high density requirements specified by Solidere as master plan, and yet others have suggested that postwar reconstruction following a national crisis of such vast proportions should never have been chained to profit motive.

It was inevitable that such an unorthodox and focused rehabilitation strategy would leave many observers dissatisfied, especially since it was undertaken in the absence of political and social consensus in Lebanon as a whole. Is not at all clear that what Solidere’s urban revitalization project lacks in terms of social inclusion and relevance can be compensated for in terms of architectural allure and capital investment--both of which are likely to benefit well-heeled stockholders long before average Beirutis—who continue to bear the brunt of partition’s negative impacts—receive their share.

In no other case examined here was comprehensive physical reconstruction initiated so decisively, implemented so quickly or accomplished according to such high technical standards. In Beirut, the efficiency of this rapid and highly organized process can be attributed to the virtues of market driven real-estate development and the willingness of Beirut’s municipal government
to give up control over such a prominent and vital project. The near total divestment of Lebanese policymakers and built environment professionals from the reconstruction process in the downtown area it is striking. Beirut is also distinguished for projecting a postwar image of itself so out of keeping with prewar realities. Though none questions the fact that Solidere has adapted the heart of the city, opinions vary regarding whether it was made stronger or weaker in the aftermath of reconstructive surgery:

[Solidere’s planners] have taken the heart of the capital, pushed the people out of it and forced them to lose ownership of the land...they ended up by dividing the city more than ever.57

Though reconstruction efforts undertaken in Beirut’s historic core have met many of their prescribed objectives, those objectives did not include many of the most glaring, important, and difficult challenges facing the city’s many desperate and traumatized residents. Accordingly, the Beirut example illustrates vividly both the virtues and shortcomings of post-war reconstruction guided by a free market.

Mostar

About 5,000 residents of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, died a result of interethnic hostilities between 1992 and 1995, including combatants and non-combatants. During the same period, as many as 40,000 prewar residents left the city altogether in order to avoid the violence, about 10,000 male residents were forcibly detained in local prisoner camps and more than 30,000 remained in the city but were compelled to leave their homes. In eastern Mostar between 1993 and 1995, supplies of food, heating fuels and medicine were consistently low and irregular, leading to a predictable set of health problems. Citizens collecting drinking water along the eastern bank of the river risked exposure to sniper fire from the surrounding hills, which also threatened pedestrians crossing bridges or traversing open spaces on essential errands. Though the number of residents physically injured or severely traumatized by the violence is not known, it can be assumed that few Mostarian families emerged from the war with all its members alive, unscathed and residing in their pre-war homes.

The costs of violence and separation between rival ethnic groups in Mostar are more neatly calculated in material terms. The physical destruction or inaccessibility of many schools, offices, homes, factories, and public infrastructure in Mostar during the course of hostilities left its citizens in the eastern sector struggling for bare survival and economic life in the western sector dominated by illicit trade. Thousands of immigrants forced to abandon surrounding villages
arrived in the city, occupying empty apartments and straining the already overburdened infrastructure. As a regional capital and one of Bosnia’s major manufacturing cities, Mostar was harshly affected by general lapses in national productivity during the war. Economic growth rates were halved with the outbreak of inter-ethnic hostilities, dipping towards -27% by the end of 1993, while the adjusted gross domestic product fell precipitously from $13.1 billion in 1990 to $6.2 billion in 1993. Theft, expulsion, and bombardment generated massive property losses. Hundreds of Bosniak families from western Mostar were obliged to abandon their homes with what they could carry, or less, leaving the bulk of their possession behind for looters or black market profiteers.

Mostar’s residents relied almost exclusively on foreign donations and expertise to jump-start the process of post-conflict recovery. As in Belfast, concepts of evenhandedness, balance, and neutrality remained inapplicable for years following the end of hostilities. Because municipal authorities on both sides of the city generally refused to cooperate, political consensus long remained an imaginary concept feebly maintained for public-relations purposes.

The burden of post-war revitalization lay most heavily on eastern Mostar, where grossly disproportionate physical and psychological punishment had been meted out to Muslim residents living within the historic Ottoman core centered on the Old Bridge. Bifurcated since the city’s physical division in 1992, the two halves of Mostar functioned as separate, autonomous and redundant cities throughout the first decade of post-conflict rehabilitation.

Physical reconstruction activities would have proceeded in a similarly bifurcated manner if municipal authorities in the eastern sector had possessed the human and material resources required to complete such an undertaking alone, but they did not. This fact forced the city to solicit foreign support and led to a dilemma. On one hand, lingering resentments between rival ethnic communities made even superficial acts of cooperation across the city’s ethnic boundary very unlikely. These odds grew worse in relation to the physical revitalization agenda, since the majority of buildings in urgent need of attention were on the eastern side of the city.
other hand, external funding agencies and foreign experts insisted that all projects relying on foreign subsidy should be undertaken in a balanced manner and with shared responsibilities. Foreign implementation agencies obliged to demonstrate impartiality in their local political relationships found it difficult to accept the fact that relatively strict functional and administrative divisions persisted long after the regional conflict was ended by the Dayton Accords. Pleased by the prospect of contributing to a lasting peace, foreign donors expected their contributions to simultaneously provide material support for physical rehabilitation and catalyze vital processes of social and political reconciliation in Mostar.

Accordingly, almost every foreign agency to invest in the city’s physical reconstruction conditioned its involvement on the demonstration of inter-ethnic cooperation within the municipal government. Local protocols were developed to provide these assurances to foreign donor agencies, and their purses gradually opened as Mostar’s rival politicians learned to shake hands and assert their commitment to partnership with increasing persuasiveness. Support materialized from quasi-governmental and nonprofit organizations like the European Union, UNESCO, War Child, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, the World monuments Fund, The World Bank, and others. Encouraged by the ease of this initial progress, many of these agencies went on to focus their efforts on a highly emblematic and historic architectural landmarks located within the Ottoman core. Though a number of rehabilitation projects undertaken in the historic core addressed structures of secondary historical importance and primary and functional value—such as schools, libraries, banks and office buildings—the majority of foreign investments were poured into highly emblematic and monumental structures. The natural centerpiece for these efforts was the facsimile reconstruction of the Old Bridge, completed in the early part of 2004 and formally dedicated in July of that year.

Among Muslim residents of eastern Mostar these efforts were initially greeted with enthusiasm and approval. As economic reforms failed to materialize in the wake of more symbolic projects, dissatisfaction became discernable at the local level. Repair of emblematic historic sites dominated postwar rehabilitation efforts because professionals were hoping to kill two birds with one stone: repair physical damage and at the same time provide encouragement for beleaguered residents of the city by replacing structures that had been most inspiring prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Mostar during reconstruction (l-r): focus on historic core, new Old Bridge, local architect at the Sevri Hadji Hasan Mosque.

This was a motivational rather than a functional revitalization strategy, and it relied heavily on the idea the physical projects can have edifying social consequences. The product of this strategy in Mostar was a kind of virtual rather than actual recovery.

In the minds and imaginations of foreign interveners, it is widely believed that a facsimile reconstruction of the fallen Old Bridge will heal social wounds by physically reuniting former antagonists and literally stitching together a divided city: Croatians on the western side and Bosniaks on the eastern side. Unfortunately, few local citizens will find much solace in the realization of this project, underwritten with the special World Bank loan and monitored by Unesco, since the front line, and the true fault line separating Muslim and Catholic communities, was the Austro-Hungarian Bulevar Narodne Revolucije lying 200 yards west of and parallel to the Neretva River. Fixation on the Old Bridge as an emblem of recovery is certainly tempting, but relatively unimportant in relation to the process of long-term social reconciliation in Mostar.

Some Mostarians resent projects that dwell on landmark structures damaged during periods of conflict, preferring a more pragmatic approach to reconstruction:

    Not until some firms or some factories are rebuilt where those people could work will we need the Old City…if only the eyes are full and the pockets empty, then there is nothing.58

Without significant revenue or local capacity to undertake large-scale urban renewal projects, reconstruction officials in Mostar were left with few appealing options in the aftermath of the war. Their decision to embrace foreign contributions from private non-governmental organizations resulted in high-profile physical reconstruction projects detached from vital social development agendas. This type of compromise is typical for divided cities beholden to an array of uncoordinated private donors because their funds often come with an inadequate understanding of the needs of urban residents and multiple incentives to invest in landmark structures. Though large flows of free foreign capital entered the city, lack of coordination and
control over how it was spent resulted in a reconstruction process marred by poor integration, superficiality, and minimal capacity upgrade.

**Effectiveness of Reconstruction in Relation to Conflict Type**

Though most post-war cities bear many outward similarities at close of hostilities, the long-term success of post-war reconstruction efforts depends on how well they relate to the type of conflict experienced by local residents. A cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Warsaw (1945-1970) and Belfast (1968-present) demonstrates two important ways that the nature of a war—its causes, combatants, and mechanisms—influences the course of reconstruction.

**Warsaw**

World War II took an especially harsh toll on Warsaw, home to a large Jewish population and scene of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising between April 19 and May 16, 1943. This desperate counter-offensive, ultimately crushed, was followed by the general Warsaw Uprising initiated on Aug. 1, 1944 by the underground Polish Home Army for the liberation of the city from Nazi control. In the end, German military command demolished the Jewish neighborhoods and much of the remainder of the city in response to these acts of resistance, leaving behind and more than 650,000 Polish dead and about 84% of the pre-war urban fabric in ruins. Hundred of thousands of other Warsavians were deported to concentration camps elsewhere in Poland before perishing.

By 1945, the capital had been transformed into a moonscape. The war had inflicted more than $45 billion in material losses alone. When US General Dwight Eisenhower visited Warsaw immediately after the war he was moved to comment, “I have seen many towns destroyed, but nowhere have I been faced with such destruction.”

Polish officials made an early decision to reconstruct the Old Town as a pre-war facsimile; in fact, many of their plans called for a return to the nineteenth century appearance of the historic core. Throughout the German siege, Warsaw’s ‘soldier-architects’ protected historic documentation and designed plans for reconstruction even while the buildings were collapsing around them. The power and vitality of the city was proven after the war when thousands of residents returned from the countryside to an urban landscape literally reduced to rubble. Their collective efforts, subsidized by intermittent funding from Poland’s new masters in Moscow, eventually restored the original appearance of inner Warsaw through a program of arduous research and
reconstruction. Because they exploited local resources in a sensitive and energetic manner, the engineers of post-war reconstruction efforts in Warsaw still serve as a model for larger projects.

Warsaw after bombardment (l-r): aerial of historic core circa 1945, central grid obliterated, Jewish ghetto fully demolished.

Why was this return to the urban prototype so essential? In 1946 a writer for *The Warsaw Escarpment* commented:

>If the Warsaw community is to be reborn, if its core is to be constituted by former Warsawians, then they have to be given back their old rebuilt Warsaw to some extent, so that they can see in it the same city, though considerably altered, and not a different town on the same spot. One must take into consideration the fact that individual attachment to old forms is a factor of social unity.

For these reasons, the more functional goals of urban renewal frequently competed with the public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details. Professionals in charge of recovery had to balance these disparate agendas. Warsaw planners struck a rather rigid bargain; permission to replicate the historic urban core was effectively traded for the simultaneous development of the outlying industrial districts according to Russian economic models that completely reconfigured the functional zones of the city with minimal concession to preexisting patterns.

Warsaw after reconstruction (l-r): restored historic core aerial, from market square, and drab post-war industrial belt.

The historic quarter was restored at the expense of the other sections of the city—dismissed by Warsaw’s new Communist overseers as worthless monuments to bourgeois values—which were demolished in advance of large projects tied to the newly centralized Socialist economy. The
values of a reconstruction patron are inevitably reflected in the character of post-war reconstruction.

The strength and popularity of the movement to restore the devastated historic core of Warsaw, even at the expense of highly functional nineteenth century fabric outside the city center, may be linked to the nature of the conflict that wrought destruction in the first place. The lines of the conflict were very clear-cut, and the Allied victory was unambiguous. Accordingly, the designation of winner and losers in the aftermath was not subject to question; despite spoiling the city and killing most of its inhabitants, the residents of Warsaw emerged from their ordeal victorious. The nihilistic campaign of their enemies had failed and the reconstruction effort would be an emblem of full recuperation—both physical and psychological. The rebuilding of the historic core, undertaken with the labor of thousands of ordinary citizens, was a kind of group therapy in response to the horrors of the war and the moral victory enjoyed by the Germans’ former enemies.

Warsaw provides a clear demonstration of the fact that reconstruction activities providing short-term psychological benefits to local residents do not necessarily generate desirable long-term results.

**Belfast**

For Belfast “The Troubles” began in earnest around 1968 with the Bombay Street riots. Ethnic rivalry continues to provoke violence between Protestants and Catholics and disturb almost every aspect of life in Northern Ireland is one of the most longstanding conflicts of its kind anywhere in the world. For centuries, Belfast has suffered the brunt of these institutionalized abuses and deprivations. Of approximately 3600 violent deaths directly associated with sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998, about 1220—almost exactly one third—took the lives of Belfast residents, the majority of which lived in the traditional working-class sectors of the city in the north and west. Most studies support the assumption that physical injuries outnumbered deaths in Northern Ireland during this period about 10 to one, and naturally occur according to the same cycles in with the same concentrations. These estimates suggest that about 13,300 residents of Belfast suffered injury or death as a direct result of sectarian violence, about 4.1% of the city's total population in 1991.

Authors of a study that measured the direct physical impacts of sectarian violence concluded that “the combination of deaths and injuries represents the primary human cost of the Troubles
although these do not encompass the trauma of grief, imprisonment and intimidation.” 60 While trauma cannot be measured directly, several indicators were selected for quantitative survey: incidence of post-traumatic stress disorders, prevalence of violent nightmares, involuntary recall violent episodes experience directly or indirectly, and pervasive feelings of guilt related to surviving events that claimed the lives to live lives of others. The incidence of all these psychological symptoms was greatest in areas of high intensity, already strongly correlated to interface areas of working-class north and west Belfast.

Other psychological impacts of an even less diagnosable major can be assumed to conform to the same general patterns, including an overarching sense of helplessness, xenophobia, claustrophobia and fatalism. Many residents of Belfast have a growing fear of leaving the enclave of which they were a member, and often felt trapped in a conference of House or neighborhood due to the inescapable fear that terrible things would happen if they ventured too far away from these relatively safe havens. Because workplaces too were frequently segregated during the period of worst violence, they did not always offer solace from the monotony of life within sectarian enclaves.

One urban planner laments the absence of built environment professionals from major decisions related to the physical partition of Belfast, where he and his colleagues contributed little to the problem of ethnic partition despite ample time and opportunity to design comprehensive strategies:

So [this is] what has defeated me all the way along the line…I can’t understand how policymaking and planning have stepped aside from all this…how all the policy statements have ignored the conflict.61

In Belfast, ethnically balanced urban plans are frequently derailed because urban planners are beholden to policy makers deeply invested in sectarian issues and tied directly to constituents in need of short-term security guarantees.

Belfast during The Troubles (l-r): Catholic children burned out, fortified interface zones, blighted housing with sectarian markings.
Under such circumstances, professional involvement with the problems of divided cities brings complicity with policies that may often run afoul of academic training or individual conscience. Confronted by a double imperative—immediate threats and directives from municipal authorities—local experts are left with few alternatives. Those that remain active are frequently forced to rationalize their actions as the lesser of several evils within an inherently dysfunctional municipal system.

Beleaguered Catholics in Northern Ireland have long maintained dual status as a statistical majority in Ireland with firm cultural ties to a friendly government in Dublin while remaining a politically disenfranchised minority in Northern Ireland. Most vulnerable are those residents impacted directly by fluctuating economic conditions, making clear the class-based component of many divided city scenarios:

There is a greater degree of conflict between the two ethnic groups in the working class context…generated by situations of scarcity and competition particularly in housing and jobs.62

Equilibrium under conditions of relative deprivation between competing ethnic groups in the urban domain tends to stabilize a discriminatory environment without a stabilized group hierarchy. This environment acts as an incubator for resentment and violence among ethnically diverse groups.

The conflict in Belfast began in 1968 and is ongoing. Under more normal conditions, the fear and violence shaping daily life in Belfast would lead to some form of resolution in light of the insupportable tensions they create. When external circumstance, third-party incentives, and legacies of discrimination disallow both cooperation and capitulation as pragmatic outlets for these tensions, new formal and informal systems are created to resolve it. Because both groups typically view themselves as a beleaguered minority, both feel entitled to take extraordinary measures in order to secure their sense of collective well-being and to compensate for disparity of needs, power, opportunity, and access to important resources. As these compensatory systems
grow in sophistication and effectiveness, they contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy of enmity while faith in conventional mechanisms of public justice and allocation erodes.

The Kobe Control

The Kobe earthquake of 1995 generated a physical and humanitarian disaster very similar to several other case studies examined in this paper. From the perspective of survivors who lost friends, family members, homes, jobs, or health, the fact that their suffering was generated by an earthquake rather than war is immaterial. The speed and effectiveness with which these concerns were addressed by reconstruction authorities, on the other hand, was of utmost relevance. The speed, nature and quality of reconstruction efforts generally distinguish the aftermath of natural disaster from post-war rehabilitation. This is especially true when they are undertaken by a wealthy, well-organized country. For this reason, a brief glance at the aftermath of Kobe’s earthquake will help to identify some of the special challenges inherent to postwar reconstruction along with several concerns bound up with reconstruction that the Kobe example shares with the case studies presented above.

At dawn on January 17, 1995, the Kobe suffered extensive damage as a result of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the strongest direct-hit earthquake Japan has suffered since the end of World War II. This episode lasted about twenty seconds and measured 7.2 on the Richter scale; it resulted in the death of approximately 6,336 urban residents, injured approximately 25,000, rendered about 310,000 homeless, left about one million households without water, 40,000 without electricity, and 850,000 without natural gas, destroyed 46,000 buildings and suspended operations at the Port, which had accommodated approximately 30% of Japan's container cargo. Material damages were estimated at $99.3 billion, half the normal yearly economic output of the city. This was the second major disaster faced by Kobe’s residents in less than 50 years.63

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The difference between the two disasters is illustrated well by the expectations of Kobe residents following the earthquake. An hour after the great tremor struck, one observer was startled to see

![Kobe (l-r): devastated by 1945 Allied bombing, housing ruined by 1995 earthquake, collapsed highway, fires that followed.](image)
men in his neighborhood, where many of the one-family houses were totally destroyed, heading for work. “They were looking at their watches and wondering why the bus hadn’t arrived on time,” he noted. Though their expectations were unmet, the anecdote underscores the notion that reconstruction following natural disaster is expected to benefit from the normal capacities of an otherwise healthy society while recovery following war is not. It can be assumed that few were consulting their watches after the bombing raids of 1945.

Response to natural disaster and man-made disaster can be distinguished by the strength and reliability of institutional support systems. The victims of the Kobe earthquake benefited from swift assistance provided by the Japanese government, its national volunteer networks, and the material stockpiles in nearby cities like Tokyo. Because the disaster occurred in a relatively wealthy and well organized country, responses to human and material losses were relatively organized and adequately funded. A few of Kobe’s reconstruction milestones are listed below in order to illustrate the behavior of a healthy response network to an isolated set of traumas:

January 1995: The national government calls for a two-month moratorium on reconstruction in order to facilitate research, planning, and public consultation.

January 31, 1995: Citywide phone service restored.

March 28, 1995: Port of Kobe Reconstruction Committee released initial progress report.

March 30, 1995: All subways functioning.

April 1, 1995: Restoration Fund established, providing 600 billion yen for socioeconomic rehabilitation aid to elderly earthquake victims, loans, and interest subsidies.

April 11, 1995: Citywide gas service restored.

April 17, 1995: Citywide water service restored.

May 1, 1995: Citywide sewage service restored.

June 20, 1995: Train service on the Hankyu and Hanshin lines restored.

June 30, 1995: Kobe City Reconstruction Plan presented for public discussion by the Kobe City Reconstruction Plan Council

July 7, 1995: Emergency Three-Year Plan for Housing Reconstruction issued, granting the provision of 82,000 housing units by public and private sectors.

July 24, 1995: Kobe Housing Restoration Plan issued, raising the number of public housing units by 10,000 to 26,100 and calling for special rent reductions

July 30, 1995: Hyogo Phoenix Plan proposed: a $170 billion undertaking for a "New Eastern City", international research institutes and 10,000 units of modern housing.
April 1, 1996: Post-Quake Citizen Support Services Head Office established, coordinating the socioeconomic rehabilitation efforts of earthquake victims

May 9, 1996: Port of Kobe Reconstruction Promotion Council established.

June 5, 1996: Citizens’ Housing Restoration Council established, facilitating socioeconomic rehabilitation and providing a venue for discussion of reconstruction measures

May 15, 1998: Socioeconomic Rehabilitation Aid For Victims Law enacted, providing cash payments for earthquake victims depending on income and age

August 10, 1998: Permanent Housing Transition Program established, categorizing eligible and non-eligible residents and providing assistance under existing aid systems.

January 7, 2000: Review and Examination of Socioeconomic Rehabilitation, with public presentation and discussion.

The high levels of planning, coordination, and program integration guiding this sequence of events are characteristic of Japanese government and were found in none of the post-war reconstruction case studies summarized above. The major priorities guiding reconstruction, along with their relative importance in the overall effort, are neatly summarized below in a chart drafted by authorities responsible for Kobe’s successful recovery:

These well-defined, ranked priorities go further to distinguish the strategy adopted by reconstruction officials in Kobe due to its highly organized, transparent, and conscientious approach.
The five year effort was far from perfect. Numerous mistakes, omissions, and complaints emerged from a review of current literature regarding the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake. Strict protocols for research, planning, and evaluation did not suit the needs of all residents. Tired of waiting for city leaders to finish plans for an elaborate reconstruction, hundreds of Kobe residents took matters into their own hands, rebuilding without official permits only to see their homes later torn down for violating retroactive zoning laws drafted later. From an economic perspective, the recovery process in Kobe was constrained by pre-earthquake trends; Kobe's importance as a regional cargo hub for East Asia had also been declining before last January as a result of competition from more modern terminals in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan's Kaohsiung and the South Korean port of Pusan. One planning official for the local Earthquake Reconstruction Bureau observed that “Kobe was already struggling when the quake hit. The damage to the economy was much more severe as a result, making it that much harder for us to recover.”

On the political front, many of Kobe’s residents were frustrated and disappointed by what they perceived as a sluggish response from national authorities. It was widely reported that while Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama pledged that his government would “waste no time in taking every necessary fiscal and financial measure”, in actuality he had learned of the disaster as much as two hours after it struck. Far from praising the efficiency of the official response, a Keio University economics professor who wrote a book about the crisis concluded that “it demonstrated the failure of Japanese government policy to keep up with environmental changes and challenges. We learned that we had no system for civil security. We have a security system for international crises, but for defense of people against natural hazards, it simply was not there.” Some critics have gone even further to argue that the deepening social crisis experienced in Japan during the mid-1990s--rising debt, scandals among powerful and once-lionized bureaucrats, and deep alienation among young people--began with “the government’s bungled response to Kobe.”
Still, its relatively thoughtful and comprehensive recovery programs distinguish post-earthquake Kobe from the majority of comparable post-conflict revitalization efforts. Unlike Mostar and Beirut, the approach to urban revitalization was comprehensive and engaged all major sectors of the social and physical environment affected. Unlike Warsaw and Coventry, the process of reconstruction was distorted by neither excessive sentimentality nor disregard for history. Unlike Dubrovnik and Belfast, the context for rebuilding was characterized by healthy bureaucracy, clear lines of institutional hierarchy, and a well-defined constituencies. In general, the progress of Kobe’s post-disaster programs was unhindered by ambiguity; all the capacities of the country as a whole could be rapidly brought to bear on the aftermath of disaster.

The challenge and hallmark of post-conflict recovery is the need to negotiate endless ambiguities and systemic deficiencies. Those internal antagonisms and institutional weaknesses that led to the outbreak of hostilities influence post-war activities with an intensity equal to, or sometimes greater than, the pre-war period. This is the context in which improved recovery strategies must be scrutinized and developed, lacking much of the clarity and efficiency observed in Kobe.

**Summary: Success Factors for Post-War Reconstruction**

Successful post-war reconstruction can be both orderly and predictable. Still, it is difficult to measure and transferable strategies are few.

There is no known blueprint for effective foreign intervention, though many pitfalls have been identified in the professional literature. Many capable and conscientious practitioners simply avoid the topic altogether. Others intervene without the social and anthropological data needed to identify the root problem and local coping mechanisms accurately. “Despite its doubtless positive influences, international assistance nonetheless has developed a stigma of general failure.”

Foreign assistance is fraught with risks, limitations, and liabilities and the cost of failure is high. The wrong kind of aid inhibits local recovery processes, monopolizes local professional capacity, creates dependence, trumps more appropriate local solutions, alienates and humiliates local authorities, affirms a sense of helplessness, institutionalizes paternalistic agency-victim relationships, and fosters traditional rivalries and inspire envy. It can constitute a secondary disaster.

Both war and the human trauma that follows are symptoms of a larger illness. Some wars are undeclared, and some impacts are impossible to measure with certainty. “Many policy makers
and field practitioners are reluctant to delve into the more controversial and ambiguous areas such as psychological trauma, conflict mitigation and even human rights protection. Unlike the conventional sectors of water, sanitation, health, shelter, and food relief, these are less quantifiable and their success may not be readily apparent.” Effective responses acknowledge all these components, reflect local dynamics and root causes, and deliver resources to points of need.

Identification of causes, consequences, and objectives requires a firm understanding of chronic stresses, patterns of episodic violence, and baseline conditions before cataclysm. A recovery scheme is working well when it addresses more than the emergency phase and is marked by decreasing levels of external manpower, funding, and guidance over time.

Historically, strong reconstruction projects utilized appropriate technologies, spend a majority of project funds within the project area, and focus their activities in a particular area or sector that corresponds to a data-driven interpretation of the root causes of conflict. These projects choose an intervention strategy that reflects long-term, systematic recovery needs and the resources available through other channels. The kind of decision making required to design such an intervention is impossible without active communication between relevant research institutions, proper application of key research findings, and balanced partnerships with local counterpart agencies.

This working paper highlighted the following issues related to potential effectiveness of post-war reconstruction programs implemented by foreign actors:

a. Disaster, whether natural or man-made, is a process “defined on the basis of its human consequences, not on the phenomenon that caused it” and should be measured by relief agencies in terms of psychological, physical, and economic disruption. (p. 5)

b. The root causes of disaster shape effective rehabilitation such that “the ongoing forces that produced the characteristics of the pre-disaster city re-emerge as the primary determinants of the city of the future.” Effective responses to conflict are part of ongoing social development, not merely a program for the provision of material aid. (p. 7-8)
c. Post-war reconstruction is often fraught with tension between popular nostalgia and professional ambition. Function-oriented goals of urban renewal frequently compete with the public’s desire for restitution of cherished scales, monuments, and details. (p. 13)

d. Foreign agencies often underestimate the value of local resources and view their relationship with the local community in terms of victims and providers, amateurs and experts, or passive and active participants. This polarity can generate distrust and discourage public participation, greatly decreasing the potency of relief efforts. (p. 14)

e. Available methods and technologies for information transfer are rarely exploited though they enable local recovery officials to strategize more efficiently and locate sources of support on a continuous basis. Often information is more valuable than money. (p. 18)

f. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Coventry and Dubrovnik shows that successful short-term responses to post-war recovery needs do not always translate into successful long-term development strategies. (p. 20ff)

g. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Beirut and Mostar shows that the effectiveness of post-war reconstruction depends on the coordinating agent’s relationship to the root causes of conflict and the affected community. (p. 26ff)

h. Cursory examination of selected reconstruction activities in post-war Warsaw and Belfast shows that most post-war cities appear similar at close of hostilities, successful post-war reconstruction strategies vary according to the nature of the conflict. (p. 32ff)

i. The speed, nature and quality of reconstruction distinguish natural disaster recover from post-war rehabilitation. More post-war reconstruction programs would resemble Kobe’s recovery if pre-war constraints did not carry over into the post-war period. (p. 37ff)

The uncoordinated and arbitrary character of most conventional interventions makes further study and discussion valuable. It is hoped that the upcoming conference hosted by the CMPD will take up the challenge of articulating and testing improved models for successful intervention.

Notes and References:


3. The latest data generated by researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, along with several other independent investigations, point in this direction.
4. Statistics on the human costs of war are abundant and contradictory. Comprehensive work has been done by Matthew White, whose *Historical Atlas of the 20th Century* ([http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstats.htm](http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstats.htm)), updated 25 January 2003; he draws statistics on all the documented wars of the last 100 years from a host of sources, then derives average and median figures from them. Also useful for global warfare trends is Monty G. Marshall’s essay *Global Warfare Trends 1946-90* published in 1999.


11. Cuny, Frederick C. *Disasters and Development*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Geipel has proposed an alternate sequence, wherein the first phase of relief occurs before the disaster occurs, a 'preparedness' phase involving planning, mitigation of risks, and warnings; the phases which follow are identified as 'response' and 'recovery.' While it is true that pre-disaster conditions affect the success of relief efforts, Cuny's presumptive model is preferred for application to post-war scenarios.


17. Mason and Tiratsoo in Diefendorf


22. Jürgen Paul, "Reconstruction of the City Center of Dresden: Planning and Building during the 1950s" in Diefendorf, 1990.


26. The brutal British attack of Lübeck in February led directly to a series of German reprisals at Bath (April 25 and 26), Canterbury (May 31; June 2 and 6), Exeter (April 23 and 24; May 3), Norwich (April 27 and 29) and York (April 28) as part of the infamous "Baedecker Raids".


28. The Germans were first; their obsessive program of demolition in Warsaw--accompanied by the infamous ghetto massacres and racial purges--was part of the "Pabst Plan" to annihilate city and build a new German city of 130,000 inhabitants directly on top; see also Stanislaw Jankowski, "Warsaw: Destruction, Secret Town Planning, 1939-44, and Postwar Reconstruction' in Diefendorf, Jerry M., ed. *Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities*. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990.


31. Diefendorf, p. 5.

32. Geipel is correct to point out that these polarities cannot ever be entirely avoided, especially within the context of war. The question of indemnification will arise whenever arbitrary losses are sustained by people due to forces beyond their control, and man-made disaster invites more specific indictments: "If caused by man people will rightfully claim compensation from the person or institution (government) or its delegate who is responsible for the disaster." In light of damages to foreign propety during WW2, for instance, Germany paid European governments a compensation "Wiedergutmachung" of $50 billion up to 1989, and the question is raised as to whether the State can be called an accomplice to disasters which could have been averted.


37. ibid.

38. ibid.


40. Operations in the Russian zone of occupation provide one example, where the radical removal of rubble and remnants of historic buildings was ordered by the mayor and undertaken block by block at night. This approach would have been shunned by occupying forces in adjacent zones: “The authorities disposed of numerous buildings in the town centers, which, had they been in Western cities, would have been restored and considered as essential elements for urban reconstruction on the basis of a compromise between old and new, between the restoration of the historically developed urban and architectural structure and the principles and aims of modern town planning.” Jürgen in Diefendorf, 1990.


43. Personal interview with Kate Bagoje, 1995.


48. From a 1936 editorial in the Midland Daily Telegraph.


51. From archival and interview material quoted in Hubbard, Lilley and Faire (2002).


54. Personal interview with Assem Salaam in Beirut, 6/7/01.

55. ibid.

56. Personal interview with Rafiq Hariri in Beirut, 6/8/01.

57. Personal interview with Assem Salaam in Beirut, 6/7/01.

58. Personal interview with Sead Djulic in Mostar, 7/12/00.


60. Parameters of “cost” investigated in Northern Ireland included deaths related to sectarian violence (assessed according to location, religion, age, and gender), health problems (post-traumatic stress disorders, sleep disruption, alcoholism, depression, involuntary recall, etc.), unemployment above the norm, public housing occupation above the norm, benefit dependency above the norm, and pervasive feelings of fear outside one’s residential neighborhood. Key variables throughout were proximity to areas of intense violence and disturbance, religion, gender, age, and income level. The Cost of the Troubles Study - Report on the Northern Ireland Survey: the Experience and Impact of the Troubles, by Marie Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, Marie Smyth, Tracy Wong: April, 1999.

61. Personal interview with Dick Oram in Beirut, 8/15/00.


63. With 1.5 million inhabitants and Japan's second largest port, Kobe’s importance was recognized by American commanders in 1945 when they bombed it 25 times from the air in the final year of World War II—the last attack came on the day Japan formally announced its surrender. Those aerial attacks ruined the city, killed 17,014 residents and left 530,858 homeless. [from Biema, David Van. “When Kobe Died.” TIME Domestic 30. Jan. 30, 1995: p. 5 ff.]

64. ibid.

65. ibid.


68. Cuny, 1983.

70. Geipel (1991) describes the erosion of trust in the rural Italian community of Fruili during its recovery from an earthquake: “The social climate was ruled by patronage, fraud, meanness of all kinds, and envy...there was a bitter fight for better subsidies, and for a better starting position in the competition for funds.”


72. Maynard, p. 201.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Key Practitioners and Scholars

Pamela Aall, Director, Education Program at the United States Institute for Peace. Special interest in education and training on conflict and peacemaking, conflict management and resolution, the role of NGOs in conflict and conflict management, and track-two diplomacy.

Morton Abramowitz, Senior Fellow, The Century Foundation; former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1991–97). Special interest in U.S. foreign policy, national security, the Balkans, Turkey.

Gareth Evans, President & CEO, International Crisis Group, a multinational non-governmental organization working through field-based analysis and high-level policy advocacy, to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. One of Australia’s longest serving Foreign Ministers, he is best known internationally for his role in helping to develop the UN peace plan for Cambodia.

Angus Gavin, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, Solidere, responsible for the Master Plan for Beirut’s Central District, special interest in the development of large urban reclamation schemes, co-author of Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central District, 1996.

Monty Marshall, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, Director of the Center for Systemic Peace, a not-for-profit social science research enterprise focusing on global systems analysis and, especially, the problem of political violence within the complex societal-system development processes.

Kimberly Maynard, President, The Cuny Center, special interest in peacebuilding strategies in humanitarian emergencies, conflict assessment and management, post conflict recovery and reconstruction, locally-driven approaches to conflict recovery, design of improved operational and coordination mechanisms, and evaluation of post-conflict recovery efforts.

Amir Pasic, Founder and Director, Mostar 2004 post-war planning workshops, Project Manager for Mostar field project for Aga Khan Trust for Culture and World Monuments Fund.

Shonali Sardesai, Research Associate for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the World Bank, provides conflict analysis aimed at optimizing project design in conflict-affected countries, administers the Post-Conflict Fund to support planning, piloting and analysis of ground-breaking approaches to the transition from conflict.

Mona Serageldin, Adjunct Professor of Urban Planning and Associate Director of The Center for Urban Development Studies at Harvard, special interest in capacity building through training and technical assistance, urban strategies for economic development, strategic planning, public/private partnerships and community-based approaches to housing and economic development.

Matthias Stiefel, Executive Director, War-torn Societies Project, designed to assist the international community and national and local actors to better understand and respond to the complex challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies in post-conflict situations.

Per Egil Wam, Social Scientist, Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank, special interest in conflict analysis, conflict prevention, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, post-conflict reconstruction.
### Appendix 2: Hypothetical Conference Agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Better theoretical approaches to post-war reconstruction: engaging social development agenda</td>
<td>Identify key constraints, faulty assumptions, obsolete models &amp; innovative proposals</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Better practical approaches to post-war reconstruction: measuring impacts in human terms</td>
<td>Identify transferable components of effective implementation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Best and worst models: case study comparison of Beirut, Mostar, Kabul, Coventry, and Dili</td>
<td>Close examination of real projects that exemplify key opportunities and pitfalls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Designing the perfect reconstruction program: phases, participants, resources, outcomes</td>
<td>Characterize the ideal reconstruction program when envisioned without constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Candidate projects for future implementation: identification, elaboration, and collaboration</td>
<td>Reach consensus on three candidate reconstruction schemes to be developed for possible implementation</td>
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Appendix 3: Select Bibliography & Additional Resources


