Incentives to lead, follow, or compete: Comparative national choices of international copyright

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

Publication Date

3-1-2011

Abstract

I study the desirability and incentives for countries to lead or follow in international copyright policy making by analyzing a lead-follow model of international copyright and comparing it with a competitive model. The analyses suggest that the lead-follow model is globally preferable except when the information products have short economic life in the leading country. In this exceptional case, the incentives of individual countries are compatible with global welfare as they also prefer the globally preferable competitive model. However, in the cases where the lead-follow model is globally preferable, individual countries do not always have the incentive to lead or follow. For example, a small country may prefer competition over leading or following, as competition may allow it to free-ride on the copyright protection provided by the larger country. This suggests that 'extraordinary' incentive is sometimes needed to induce individual countries to adopt the lead-follow model of international copyright when it is globally desirable. © 2011 Taylor & Francis.

Volume

20

Issue

2

First Page

153

Last Page

181

DOI

10.1080/10438590903378025

ISSN

10438599

E-ISSN

14768364

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