A better copyright system? comparing welfare of indefinitely renewable copyright versus fixed-length copyright

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Economics of Innovation and New Technology

Publication Date

1-1-2006

Abstract

This study models and simulates fixed-length copyright (FLC) and indefinitely renewable copyright (IRC) and compares their social welfare. Evidence is found suggesting that IRC has lower maximal social welfare than FLC does. This difference can be explained by the way copyright duration is determined. Copyright duration represents the balance between encouraging creation and reducing restrictions on the consumption of information products. Under FLC, copyright duration is chosen directly by legislation; under IRC, it is induced indirectly through a copyright fee. However, the imposition of a copyright fee distorts the behavior of creators and thus decreases social welfare. © 2006 Taylor & Francis.

Volume

15

Issue

6

First Page

519

Last Page

542

DOI

10.1080/10438590500284493

ISSN

10438599

E-ISSN

14768364

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